Journal of Indian Philosophy 2010 - 38,2-4

Journal of Indian Philosophy
Journal of Indian philosophy / Editor-in-Chief: Phyllis Granoff. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer [u.a.].
Erscheinungsverlauf: 1.1970/72 -
ISSN 0022-1791 (Printausg.)
ISSN 1573-0395 (Online-Ausg.)
URL: Homepage
URL: Online-Ausg. (Springerlink)

Inhalt: 38,2-4 (2010)

• Gregory Schopen: „On Incompetent Monks and Able Urbane Nuns in a Buddhist Monastic Code“, JIP 38,2 (2010), S. 107-131
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9085-9
  

  Abstract: Most modern scholars seem to assume that Buddhist monks in early India had a good knowledge of Buddhist doctrine and at least of basic Buddhist texts. But the compilers of the vinayas or monastic codes seem not to have shared this assumption. The examples presented here are drawn primarily from one vinaya, and show that the compilers put in place a whole series of rules to deal with situations in which monks were startlingly ignorant of both doctrine and text. One of these examples is particularly interesting for what it suggests about the linguistic sophistication of nuns, and another because it presents a case in which a nun is required to fill an important liturgical role in public and in the presence of monks.

• Mari Jyväsjärvi: „Retrieving the Hidden Meaning: Jain Commentarial Techniques and the Art of Memory“, JIP 38,2 (2010), S. 133-162
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9086-8
  

  Abstract: One of the peculiar characteristics of the vast body of Jain commentarial literature is the primacy given to artha, meaning, over sūtra, the root text itself. It is the task of the commentator—or, in a pedagogical context, the teacher—to retrieve and explain a text’s true, hidden meaning, which often appears to stretch and even contradict its apparent meaning. This article examines the interpretive processes in one of the most important Jain commentaries on monastic discipline, the Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya attributed to the sixth-century CE Śvetāmbara Jain exegete Saṅghadāsa. An examination of passages where the commentator claims to uncover the real—but sometimes less-than-apparent—meaning of monastic rules enables us to detect the interpretive moves involved and the underlying assumptions about the nature of text and the work of commentary. I argue that this commentarial tradition presupposes particular practices of memory, and a degree of internalizing the traditional hermeneutical methods, on the part of a monastic practitioner who wants to understand the text correctly and live according to its true meaning.

• Parimal G. Patil: „History, Philology, and the Philosophical Study of Sanskrit Texts Jonardon Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical India“, JIP 38,2 (2010), S. 163-202
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9084-x
  

  Abstract: This paper is a critical review of Jonardan Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical India.

• Birgit Kellner: „Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 203-231
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9091-y
  

  Abstract: The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.

• Hisayasu Kobayashi: „Self-Awareness and Mental Perception“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 233-245
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9096-6
  

  Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] (mānasa) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ (idam iti jñānam). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense.

• Taiken Kyuma: „Śālikanātha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s svasaṃvedana Theory“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 247-259
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9097-5
  

  Abstract: The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.

• Shinya Moriyama: „On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 261-277
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9092-x
  

  Abstract: This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramāṇa-pramāṇaphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramāṇavārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.

• John Taber: „Kumārila’s Buddhist“, JIP 38,2 (2010), S. 279-296
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9093-9
  

  Abstract: The pūrvapakṣa of the Śūnyavāda chapter of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (vv. 10-63) is the longest continuous statement of a Buddhist position in that work. Philosophically, this section is of considerable interest in that the arguments developed for the thesis that the form (ākāra) in cognition belongs to the cognition, not to an external object, are cleverly constructed. Historically, it is of interest in that it represents a stage of thinking about the two-fold nature of cognition and the provenance of the ākāra that is clearly more advanced than Dignāga but not quite as sophisticated as Dharmakīrti. In particular, although one may see an anticipation of Dharmakīrti’s famous sahopalambhaniyama argument in this text, it is not yet fully spelled out.

• Alex Watson: „Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 297-321
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9094-8
  

  Abstract: The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda, the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmakaṇṭha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.

• Dan Arnold: „Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues“, JIP 38,3 (2010), S. 323-378
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9095-7
  

  Abstract: Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyakṣa (which is akin to manovijñāna) might relate to svasaṃvitti; how those related doctrines might be brought to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to svasaṃvitti) concerning pramāṇaphala; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument for svasaṃvitti. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) svasaṃvitti reflects a perceptual or a constitutive understanding of self-awareness.

• Eviatar Shulman: „The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster: Innovation in Candrakīrti’s Prasanna-padā“, JIP 38,4 (2010), S. 379-417
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9087-7
  

  Abstract: This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakīrti. It is shown that there is strong reason to doubt Candrakīrti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakīrti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by Candrakīrti is next contrasted to Nāgārjuna’s style of argument, and it is shown that these two author’s notions of emptiness, as well as their particular implementation of Madhyamaka logic, significantly diverge from each other. Finally, Candrakīrti’s reading of these verses is compared with his commentary on MMK 15 so as to suggest a possible subtle metaphysical position that is at the base of his thinking.

• Ramkrishna Bhattacharya: „Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra: A Critical Survey“, JIP 38,4 (2010), S. 419-430
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9088-6
  

  Abstract: In spite of the fact that the mūla-text of the Cārvākasūtra is lost, we have some 30 fragments of the commentaries written by no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalāśvatara, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Udbhaṭa. The existence of other commentators too has been suggested, of whom only one name is mentioned: Bhāvivikta. Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. The position of the Cārvākas was nearer the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any other philosophical system. But in order to brand the Cārvākas as pramāṇaikavādins they were made to appear as one with Bhartṛhari. Even though the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra had some differences among themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to have been unanimous in regard to the number of pramāṇas to be admitted. It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they were pramāṇaikavādins. Unlike other systems of philosophy, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata did not accord equal value to perception and inference. Inference, they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it was of secondary kind (gauṇa). From the available evidence it is clear that the commentators were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both Aviddkarṇa and Udbhaṭa were in agreement with Purandara. Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa or Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was known as a commentator who differed from the traditional Cārvākas and broke new grounds in explaining some of the aphorisms. His commentary is creative in its own way but at the same time unreliable in reconstructing the original Cārvāka position. Udbhaṭa seems to have digressed from the original, monist materialist position by taking a dualist position concerning the body-consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in his explication of an aphorism. In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist. Aviddhakarṇa, like Udbhaṭa, attempted to interpret the Cārvāka aphorisms from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, perhaps without being converted to the Cārvāka. Since it is not possible at the present state of our knowledge to determine whether they were Cārvākas converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas converted to Lokāyata, the suggestion that they simply adopted the Cārvāka position while writing their commentaries without being converted to the Cārvāka, may be taken as a third alternative. In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the other systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of the Cārvākasūtra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic materialists; at least one, namely, Udbhaṭa, was a dualist, and (3) in course of time Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite foreign to the traditional Cārvāka, has been introduced into the Cārvāka system.

• D. S. Duckworth: „Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika“, JIP 38,4 (2010), S. 431-439
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9089-5
  

  Abstract: In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.

• Yaroslav Komarovski: „Shakya Chokden’s Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga: "Contemplative" or "Dialectical"?“, JIP 38,4 (2010), S. 441-452
  DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9090-z
  

  Abstract: This reconciliation of the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the buddha-essence is related to and closely resembles Shakchok’s reconciliation of the two approaches to ultimate reality advocated respectively by Niḥsvabhāvavāda (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba, “Proponents of Entitylessness”) system of Madhyamaka and Alīkākāravāda (rnam rdzun pa, “False Aspectarians”) system of Yogācāra. These approaches in turn are connected respectively to the explicit teachings (dngos bstan) of the second dharmacakra (chos ’khor, “Wheel of Dharma”) and the definitive teachings (nges don, nītārtha) of the third dharmacakra that he also presents in a reconciliatory manner. In the same way as the teachings of the last two dharmacakras, as well as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda systems that derive from them, come to the same point, the dialectical and contemplative traditions also come to the same point. This point is the above-mentioned naturally pure primordial mind luminous by nature, the ultimate reality. In Shakchok’s opinion, application of non-affirming negations is a powerful tool for accessing direct realization of that reality, while its identification as primordial mind (ye shes, jñāna) is important for maintaining that realization and turning it into the basis of unfolding positive qualities on the path to buddhahood. When in the passage above Shakchok says that the two traditions are not contradictory, and when he reconciles the two last dharmacakras together with Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda, he is not arguing that their words are non-contradictory. They obviously are! Nevertheless, those systems are non-contradictory in terms of complementing each other in getting access to and maintaining realization of the ultimate reality of primordial mind.