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Journal of Indian Philosophy 2010 - 38,1

Journal of Indian Philosophy
Journal of Indian philosophy / Editor-in-Chief: Phyllis Granoff. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer [u.a.].
Erscheinungsverlauf: 1.1970/72 -
ISSN 0022-1791 (Printausg.)
ISSN 1573-0395 (Online-Ausg.)
URL: Homepage
URL: Online-Ausg. (Springerlink)

Inhalt: 38,1 (Februar 2010)

  • Sung Yong Kang: „An Inquiry into the Definition of tarka in Nyāya Tradition and Its Connotation of Negative Speculation“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 1-23
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9078-8
    Abstract: The technical term “tarka” in the Nyāya tradition is the object of the present investigation. Diverse texts including Buddhist ones exhibit a negative estimation of activities using tarka. In contrast, more often than not, later treatises dealing with logico-epistemic problems, especially certain Naiyāyika works, identify the methodological peculiarity of Nyāya with tarka. Such an ambivalent attitude toward tarka can be understood in a coherent way if the essential features of tarka that gave rise to it can be grasped. Starting from the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.40 and the explanation given in the Nyāyabhāṣya on it, the present researcher sorted out three characteristic features of tarka in the early Nyāya tradition. These three features focus on the main feature of tarka: namely, reflective analysis without requiring further factual information on the object of investigation. Based on this, the present researcher critically reviewed what promoted an understanding of tarka as a reductio ad absurdum argument or an a priori reasoning. Furthermore, certain passages from the Nyāyamañjarī, Nyāyakalikā, and Tarkasaṅgraha were examined to demonstrate that the present researcher’s interpretative understanding of tarka was adequate for explaining the usage of this term in a broad sense, with positive connotations.

  • David Brick: „The Court of Public Opinion and the Practice of Restorative Ordeals in Pre-Modern India“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 25-38
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9082-z
    Abstract: According to their standardized treatment within the Indian legal tradition (Dharmaśāstra), ordeals (Sanskrit: divya) are supposed to occur, under certain circumstances, when one person formally accused another of some crime in a court of law. While not disputing the general accuracy of this standardized treatment of ordeals, this article argues for the widespread practice in pre-modern India of another—hitherto unrecognized—type of ordeal that fails to fit this basic scenario, for such ordeals would occur when someone was widely believed to have committed some wrongdoing, but was not forced to stand trial in a formal judicial court. In order to prove his innocence and, thereby, mitigate the damage caused by his suspected guilt, such an individual could—and sometimes did—arrange for himself to undergo an ordeal at his own expense and independently of any formal plaint. After establishing the practice of ordeals of this sort in pre-modern India, this article then examines some possible explanations for their development.

  • Elisa Freschi: „Facing the Boundaries of Epistemology: Kumārila on Error and Negative Cognition“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 39-48
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9079-7
    Abstract: Kumārila’s commitment to the explanation of cognitive experiences not confined to valid cognition alone, allows a detailed discussion of border-line cases (such as doubt and error) and the admittance of absent entities as separate instances of cognitive objects. Are such absent entities only the negative side of positive entities? Are they, hence, fully relative (since a cow could be said to be the absent side of a horse and vice versa)? Through the analysis of a debated passage of the Ślokavārttika, the present article proposes a reconstruction of Kumārila’s view of the relation between erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence (abhāva), and considers the philosophical problem of the ontological status of absence.

  • Alberto Todeschini: „Twenty-Two Ways to Lose a Debate: A Gricean Look at the Nyāyasūtra’s Points of Defeat“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 49-74
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9083-y
    Abstract: This paper is a study of debate practices as seen in the Nyāyasūtra and a number of commentaries. It concentrates on the ‘Points of Defeat’ (nigrahasthāna), i.e., those occasions that if met in debate would entail defeat. The conditions under which a debater would meet with defeat were discussed widely in India and have also attracted considerable attention from modern scholars. In order to better understand this subject, use is made of some of the intuitions about language and conversation that we owe to the philosopher H. P. Grice (1913–1988) as well as of some recent theoretical advances in argumentation theory and informal logic, particularly of those most influenced by Grice’s thought. The Points of Defeat are studied both individually and as a group and it is shown that they point towards the practice of debating as being a rational, cooperative and goal-directed activity.

  • Hugh Nicholson: „The Shift from Agonistic to Non-Agonistic Debate in Early Nyāya“. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 75-95
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9081-0
    Abstract: This article examines the emergence of the Nyāya distinction between vāda and jalpa as didactic-scientific and agonistic-sophistical forms of debate, respectively. Looking at the relevant sutras in Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra (NS 1.2.1-3) in light of the earlier discussion of the types of debate in Caraka Saṃhitā 8, the article argues that certain ambiguities and obscurities in the former text can be explained on the hypothesis that the early Nyāya presupposed an agonistic understanding of vāda similar to what we find in Caraka.

  • Douglas S. Duckworth: „De/limiting Emptiness and the Boundaries of the Ineffable“. - In: Journal of Indian Philosophy. - 38 (2010), 1, S. 97-105
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9080-1
    Abstract: Emptiness (śūnyatā) is one of the most important topics in Buddhist thought and also is one of the most perplexing. Buddhists in Tibet have developed a sophisticated tradition of philosophical discourse on emptiness and ineffability. This paper discusses the meaning(s) of emptiness within three prominent traditions in Tibet: the Geluk (dge lugs), Jonang (jo nang), and Nyingma (rnying ma). I give a concise presentation of each tradition’s interpretation of emptiness and show how each interpretation represents a distinctive aspect of its meaning. Given that Buddhist traditions (1) accept an extra-linguistic reality and (2) maintain a strong tradition of suspicion of language with the belief that language both constructs and distorts reality, this paper responds to an issue that is not so much whether or not an inexpressible reality can be expressed, but rather how it is best articulated.