Navigation überspringen.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 2011 - 39,4-5

Journal of Indian Philosophy
Journal of Indian philosophy / Editor-in-Chief: Phyllis Granoff. - Vol. 39,4-5. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer [u.a.], 2011.
ISSN 0022-1791 (Printausg.)
ISSN 1573-0395 (Online-Ausg.)
URL: Homepage
URL: Online-Ausg. (Springerlink)

Inhalt: 39,4-5 (2011)
Special issue on 14th World Sanskrit Conference / Guest Editors: Mark Siderits, Shoryu Katsura und Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
Nilanjan Das: Lakṣaṇā as Inference. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 353-366
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9132-1
Abstract: This paper questions a few assumptions of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s theory of ordinary verbal cognition (laukika-śābdabodha). The meaning relation (vṛtti) is of two kinds: śakti (which gives us the primary referent of a word) and lakṣaṇā (which yields the secondary referent). For Gaṅgeśa, the ground (bīja) of lakṣaṇā is a sort of inexplicability (anupapatti) pertaining to the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings. In this connection, one notices that the case of lakṣaṇā is quite similar to that of one variety of postulation, namely, śrutārtāthāpatti, where the subject hears only a part of a sentence and immediately grasps the words that are needed to render the sentential meaning complete. Unless he does that, sentential meaning, i.e., the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings shall suffer from the same inexplicability that characterizes instances of lakṣaṇā. In fact, in the ‘Śaktivāda’ section of Tattvacintāmaṇi, Gaṅgeśa himself draws a parallel between the cognition of sentential meaning in a śrutārthāpatti-like case and the cognition of sentential meaning in an instance of lakṣaṇā. However, Gaṇgesa himself treats Śrutārthāpatti as a piece of inferential cognition. If there is no fundamental difference between cases of śrutārthāpatti and cases of lakṣaṇā, then the cognition of sentential meaning in instances of lakṣaṇā must also be inferential in essence. In that case, we must admit, against Gaṅgeśa’s view, that such cognition of sentential meaning cannot be accommodated within the framework of verbal cognition (śābdabodha). Therefore, I conclude that some revision is needed in Gaṅgeśa’s theory of verbal cognition with respect to lakṣaṇā.

Pascale Hugon: Is Dharmakīrti Grabbing the Rabbit by the Horns? A Reassessment of the Scope of Prameya in Dharmakīrtian Epistemology. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 367-389
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9137-9
Abstract: This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition (prameya) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya, and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya. It inquires into the relationship between validity (prāmāṇya), reliability (avisaṃvāda) and causal efficacy (arthakriyā) and suggests that the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 provides an alternative to an overall “practicalist” reading of Dharmakīrti, practicalist in the sense that pramāṇas are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmakīrti’s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriyā-oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of “non-opposition” (abādhana) introduced by Dharmakīrti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects.

Kyo Kano: Sātmaka, Nairātmya, and A-Nairātmya: Dharmakīrti’s Counter-Argument Against the Proof of Ātman. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 391-410
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9138-8
Abstract: Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof (avīta/āvīta), is presented in a prasaṅga-style, and contains double negation (na nairātmyam) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style (sātmakam). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa. On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion (vyāpti). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman, discusses the negative expressions ‘‘nairātmya” and ‘‘a-nairātmya” Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman, he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka, whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya, because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs.

Birgit Kellner: Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 411-426
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9139-7
Abstract: This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must be cognised in order to enable subsequent memory of it, for Dharmakīrti it must be cognised if it is to cognise an object.

Hisayasu Kobayashi: Prajñākaragupta on the Two Truths and Argumentation. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 427-439
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9140-1
Abstract: How is it possible to say that truth can be of one kind at the conventional level and totally different in the ultimate plane? As Matilal (1971, p. 154) points out, Kumārila (ca. 600–650), a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, claims that the Buddhist doctrine of two truths is “a kind of philosophical ‘double-talk’.” It is Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), a Buddhist logician, who tries to give a direct answer to this question posed by Kumārila from the Buddhist side. He argues that even a Mīmāṃsaka cannot demonstrate the validity (prāmāṇya) of the Veda without accepting two truth levels. His point is this. Consider the proposition to be proved: the Veda is valid. If the Veda is already known as valid, then it is useless to prove this proposition. But if it is already known as invalid, then it is impossible to prove this proposition. Therefore in the argument to prove the proposition, the Veda is not to be regarded either as valid or as invalid. This means that at the first stage of the argument one has the concept of the Veda as neutral in validity. However, as soon as one acquires the knowledge of the Veda as valid through the argument, one has to repudiate such a conception of the Veda. The acceptance of the Veda as neutral in validity is to the acceptance of the Veda as valid as the conventional truth is to the ultimate truth.

Gianni Pellegrini: Analysis of the Second and Fourth Definitions of Mithyātva in the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 441-459
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9141-0
Abstract: This paper is a preliminary analysis of two among the five definitions of falsity (mithyātva) presented by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (MS) in his magnum opus, the Advaitasiddhi. It is mainly focused on the second and fourth definitions, which at first sight appear to be mere repetitions of one another. The first definition of falsity examined is Prakāśātman’s: “falsity is the property of being the counter-positive of the absolute absence of an entity in the [same] locus in which it is perceived.” The other definition investigated was first given by Citsukha: “falsity is the property of being the counter-positive of the absolute absence residing in its own locus.” The mutual differences among these two definitions will be underlined following MS himself, as well as some other authors of the later Advaita Vedānta textual tradition.

Alexis Pinchard: The Argumentative Value of Āgamic Quotations in the Sphoṭasiddhi by Bharata Miśra. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 461-477
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9142-z
Abstract: In a rare book published in Trivandrum (1927), entitled Sphoṭasiddhiḥ Bharatamiśrapranītā, we find an interesting argument in defense of sphoṭa-theory, based on āgamic quotations, especially RV X, 71, 4 (the stanza where the poet describes his own activity in perceiving the essence of Speech as like a beloved woman naked). The main idea is that the numerous word sphoṭas, as an atemporal multiplicity, free from any sensuous quality, were the objects of the Ṛṣis’ primordial intuition. So the internal diversity of the Veda is not a mere subjective convention in order to adapt the highest truth to limited human minds. The absolute brahman has an objective cosmogonical power of which the temporal mutiplicity is only the very last result. There is also an intermediate ideal multiplicity, which the Veda, as eternal and transcending the guru-śiṣya transmission, consists in.

Isabelle Ratié: Can One Prove that Something Exists Beyond Consciousness? A Śaiva Criticism of the Sautrāntika Inference of External Objects. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 479-501
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9143-y
Abstract: This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic Śaiva philosophers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries) present and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identified by the two Śaiva authors as Sautrāntikas. According to this theory, no entity external to consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal aspects (ākāra) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reflecting a multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external to consciousness. In Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās I, 5, 8–9 and their commentaries, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautrāntikas’ inference is neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards the strategy developed by Pratyabhijñā philosophers with respect to their Buddhist opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmakīrti in defense of Vijñānavāda in order to criticize the Sautrāntikas’ inference, but they also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of the Vijñānavādins.

Taisei Shida: Hypothesis-Generating Logic in Udayana’s Rational Theology. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 503-520
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9144-x
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to clarify Udayana’s logic in his theistic monograph Nyāyakusumāñjali, especially in the second chapter where he postulates as conclusion the existence of God. In the course of this postulation, Udayana gives as its reason such Nyāya theories as the extrinsic validity of cognition (*parataḥprāmāṇya) and the creation and dissolution of the world (*sargapralaya). The present paper first focuses on the argument over the creation and dissolution of the world, clarifying whether Udayana asserts its necessary occurrence or just its possibility. It then analyzes the precise logic of Udayana that generates the theistic hypothesis, comparing it with a logic called abduction which is put forward by Charles Peirce.

Kiyokuni Shiga: Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 521-534
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9133-0
Abstract: Previous studies have claimed that the term ‘all-inclusive pervasion’ (sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti) appeared for the first time in the Hetubindu, and that it was Dharmakīrti who created this theory. This article attempts to modify this view and to show that the prototype of this theory can already be found in Dignāga’s system of logic. Dignāga states in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti that the co-existence of a logical reason with what is to be proved is understood by means of two types of exemplification that sum up external items (bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta). Furthermore, with respect to where the pervasion is indicated, he states in the second chapter of the same work that the non-deviation of a logical mark from what is to be proved is indicated elsewhere (anyatra). He also implies that anyatra means in the substratum in general (ādhārasāmānya) and that the subject is implicitly included in other substrata, i.e., in the substratum in general. Building upon Dignāga’s awareness of the issue, the conflict between the universality of pervasion and the particularity of actual inference, Dharmakīrti reinforced Dignāga’s system of logic by demonstrating that a property to be proved as the universal is not particularised by the subject by the use of the idea of ‘the exclusion of nonconnection’ (ayogavyavaccheda) and by adopting the concept of ‘all’ in place of ‘external items’.

Toshiya Unebe: “Apūrva,” “Devatā,” and “Svarga”: Arguments on Words Denoting Imperceptible Objects. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 535-552
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9134-z
Abstract: We cannot directly perceive and experience objects of words such as “apūrva” “devatā,” and “svarga,” while objects of words such as “cow” and “horse” are perceptible. Therefore in the Indian linguistic context, some assert that there are two categories of words. However, a grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari (450 CE) in the second book of his Vākyapadīya, introduces a verse stating that there is no difference between them. Other Indian thinkers as well deal with this issue in various contexts. This paper aims at exploring the ideas expressed in Bhartṛhari’s verse and the related arguments found in other treatises of different schools. It consists of discussions of the followingt: (1) Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya 2.119 and its commentarial texts; (2) Kumārila’s Criticism; (3) The Nyāya context; (4) The Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist context; (5) Related grammatical passages and the background of the Vākyapadīya 2.119; and (6) Conclusion.

Toshikazu Watanabe: Dharmakīrti’s Criticism of Anityatva in the Sāṅkhya Theory. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 553-569
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9135-y
Abstract: In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the word anityatva (“impermanence”) means a process of transformation (pariṇāma) of primordial matter (pradhāna). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance (tirodhāna) of the previous dharma of an entity (dharmin/dravya) and (2) the cessation (nivṛtti) of the previous state (avasthā) of an entity (avasthātṛ). In response to these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction (vināśa). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu’s criticism allows room for a retort from the Sāṅkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu’s theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory.

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu: How to Refer to a Thing by a Word: Another Difference Between Dignāga’s and Kumārila’s Theories of Denotation. - In: JIP. - 39,4-5 (2011), S. 571-587
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-011-9136-x
Abstract: In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalakṣaṇa). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaraṇa) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.